One key way to reduce the risk of a breach is continuous improvement of information security programs. It's dangerous to put security controls in place and then walk away, thinking you're finished, warns security expert Kate Borten.
An independent presidential panel makes recommendations to limit the National Security Agency's surveillance methods, including curtailing the way the government systematically collects and stores metadata from Americans' phone calls.
A federal district court judge's ruling that a National Security Agency program collecting metadata from telephone calls could be unconstitutional suggests that the law hasn't kept pace with changing technology.
NSA Director Gen. Keith Alexander says the agency has taken 41 actions to prevent leaks by insiders in the wake of disclosures of classified documents about the agency's surveillance programs by former agency contractor Edward Snowden.
You can be outraged that the NSA collects Internet communications records of U.S. citizens. But don't be surprised, says sociologist William Staples. This is just one example of our "culture of surveillance."
For years, researchers have studied malicious insider threats. But how can organizations protect themselves from insiders who make a mistake or are taken advantage of in a way that puts the organization at risk?
The average insider scheme lasts 32 months before it's detected, says threat researcher Jason Clark, who suggests using a combination of the right technologies and the right processes is the key to improving detection.
Randy Trzeciak and his CERT Insider Threat Center colleagues are working to broaden the definition of the insider threat to incorporate not just the risk to information and IT but to facilities and people, too.
A former respiratory therapist has pleaded guilty in an ID theft case involving more than 800 patient records. A security expert explains why detecting insider fraud can be difficult and offers prevention tips.